Zero-determinant (ZD) strategies are a novel class of strategies in the Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma (RPD) game discovered by Press and Dyson. This strategy set enforces a linear payoff relationship between a focal player and the opponent regardless of the opponent's strategy. In the RPD game, a discount factor and observation errors are both important because they often happen in society. However, they were not considered in the original discovery of ZD strategies. In some preceding studies, each of them were considered independently. Here, we analytically study the strategies that enforce linear payoff relationships in the RPD game considering both a discount factor and observation errors. As a result, we first revealed that the payoffs of two players can be represented by the form of determinants as shown by Press and Dyson even with the two factors. Then, we searched for all possible strategies that enforce linear payoff relationships and found that both ZD strategies and unconditional strategies are the only strategy sets to satisfy the condition. Moreover, we numerically derived minimum discount rates for the one subset of the ZD strategies in which the extortion factor approaches to infinity. For the ZD strategies whose extortion factor is finite, we numerically derived the minimum extortion factors above which such strategies exist. These results contribute to a deep understanding of ZD strategies in society.
Introduction
Cooperation is a basis for building sustainable societies. In a one-shot interaction, 2 cooperation among individuals is suppressed because cooperation takes costs to the 3 actor while defection does not. This cooperation-defection relationship is well 4 understood by the prisoner's dilemma (PD) game utilized in game theory. In the 5 one-shot PD game, defection is the only Nash equilibrium. When the game is 6 repeated, the situation drastically changes, which is modeled by the repeated and mathematically found the minimum discount factor above which the ZD strategies 48 can exist [55] . σ((b, b)|(C, C)) = ξ are realized. 73 In each round, player i's realized payoff u i (a i , ω i ) is determined by his own action 74 a i and signal ω i , such that u i (C, g) = R, u i (C, b) = S, u i (D, g) = T , and u i (D, b) = P . 75 Hence, his expected payoff is given by
The expected payoff is determined by only action profile a regardless of signal profile 77 ω. Thus, the expected payoff matrix is given by
.
According to Eq. (1), R E , S E , T E , and P E are derived as R E = R(1 − ϵ − ξ) + S(ϵ + ξ), 79 S E = S(1 − ϵ − ξ) + R(ϵ + ξ), T E = T (1 − ϵ − ξ) + P (ϵ + ξ), 80 P E = P (1 − ϵ − ξ) + T (ϵ + ξ), respectively. We assume that
and 82
which dictate the RPD condition with observation errors. 83 In this paper, we introduce a discount factor to the RPD game with private 84 monitoring. The game is to be played repeatedly over an infinite time horizon but the 85 payoff will be discounted over rounds. Player i's discounted payoff of action profiles 86 a t , t ∈ {0, 1, ..., ∞} is w t f i (a t ) where t is a round. This game can be interpreted as 87 repeated games with a finite but undetermined time horizon. Finally, the average 88 discounted payoff of player i is 89
Determinant form of expected payoff in the RPG game 90 Here, we proceed to show that Eq. (5) can be represented by a determinant form even 91 for the repeated games with observation errors and a discount factor, as Press and 92 Dyson did for the repeated game without error and no discount factor [9] . The action 93 profiles a t in Eq. (5) need to be specified to calculate s i . Those profiles are determined 94 after the strategies of two players are given. Consider player i that adopts 95 memory-one strategies, with which they can use only the outcomes of the last round 96 to decide the action to be submitted in the current round. A memory-one strategy is 97 specified by a 5-tuple; X's strategy is given by a combination of 98 p = (p 1 , p 2 , p 3 , p 4 ; p 0 ),
where 0 ≤ p j ≤ 1, j ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3, 4}. The subscripts 1, 2, 3, and 4 of p mean previous 99 outcome Cg, Cb, Dg and Db, respectively. In Eq. (6), p 1 is the conditional probability 100 that X cooperates when X cooperated and observed signal g in the last round, p 2 is 101 the conditional probability that X cooperates when X cooperated and observed signal 102 b in the last round, p 3 is the conditional probability that X cooperates when X 103 defected and observed signal g in the last round, and p 4 is the conditional probability 104 that X cooperates when X defected and observed signal b in the last round. Finally, 105 p 0 is the probability that X cooperates in the first round. Similarly, Y 's strategy is 106 specified by a combination of
where
, v 4 (t)) as the stochastic state of two players in 109 round t where the subscripts 1, 2, 3, and 4 of v imply the stochastic states (C,C),
110
(C,D), (D,C), and (D,D), respectively. v 1 (t) is the probability that both players 111 cooperate in round t, v 2 (t) is the probability that X cooperates and Y defects in 112 round t, and so forth. Then, the expected payoff to player X in round t is given by
The expected per-round payoff to player X in 114 the repeated game is given by
where 0 < w < 1. The initial stochastic state is given by
The state transition matrix M of these repeated games with observation errors is 117 given by
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where τ = 1 − 2ϵ − ξ. Then, we obtain
By substituting Eq. (11) in Eq (8), we obtain 120
where I is the 4 × 4 identity matrix. Then, let
be the mean distribution of v(t). Additionally, we define
Because v 1 + v 2 + v 3 + v 4 = 1 (S1 Appendix), the following holds (S2 Appendix)
By substituting Eq. (15) in Eq. (13) and multiplying both sides of the equation by 124 (I − wM ) from the right, we obtain
Equation (16) and
Applying Cramer's rule to matrix M ′ , we obtain
where Adj(M ′ ) is the adjugate matrix of M ′ . Eqs. (17) and (18) imply that every row 128 of Adj(M ′ ) is proportional to v. Therefore, v is solely represented by the components 129 of matrix M ′ . Choosing the fourth row of the matrix Adj(M ′ ), we see that v is 
where µ = 1 − ϵ − ξ and η = ϵ + ξ. where future payoffs are not discounted.
146

Results
147
Mathematical analysis 148 Since we are interested in the payoff relationship between the two players, we linearly 149 combine those payoffs represented by Eqs. (20) and (21). The linear combination of 150 s X and s Y can also be represented by the form of the determinant:
where α, β, and γ, are arbitrary constants. The numerator of the right side of Eq. (22) 152 is expressed in the following:
If Eq. (23) is zero, the relationship between the two players' payoffs becomes linear
Thus, we search for all of the solutions such that D(p, q, αS X + βS Y + γ1) = 0. 
where vector 0 denotes a zero vector. We give the detailed calculation in S3 Appendix. 168 As a result, we found that, in the RPD game even with observation errors 169 (imperfect monitoring) and a discount factor, the only strategies that impose a linear 170 payoff relationship between the two players' payoffs are either
Existence of subsets of ZD strategies 173 Since observation errors and a discount factor are considered, in general, the ranges in 174 which ZD strategies can exist are narrowed. Ichinose and Masuda mathematically 175 showed the minimum discount rates above which Equalizer (a subclass of ZD 176 strategies) can exist [55] . Here, we numerically address threshold values where subsets 177 of ZD strategies can exist.
178
Minimum discount factor for Equalizer 179 Equalizer strategies are a subclass of ZD strategies. We first show minimum discount 
This is obtained by substituting α = 0 into Eq. (24) . We substitute α = 0 into 183 Eq. (26) to obtain Equalizer
If we solve Eq. (29) for β, γ, p 2 and p 3 ,
January 13, 2020 7/18 are obtained. By substituting β and γ into Eq. (28), player Y 's payoff is fixed at
Equations (30) and (31) correspond to Eq. (10) in [52] when w = 1.
187
Equalizer must satisfy the condition 0 ≤ p i ≤ 1 in Eq. (29) . The existence of 188 Equalizer strategies also depends on w, ϵ and ξ. We numerically find the minimum 189 discount rate w c and the condition of (ϵ, ξ) that Equalizer exists. w ≥ w c is the 190 condition for w under which Equalizer strategies exist.
191 Figure 1 shows w c when ϵ + ξ is given. We set (T, R, P, S) = (1.5, 1, 0, −0.5) and 
In Eq. (32), we obtain Extortion when κ = P and Generous when κ = R with 202 1 ≤ χ < ∞ when there are no errors (ϵ + ξ = 0) and no discount factor (w = 1). Note 203 that χ → ∞ in Eq. (32) corresponds to Equalizer [52] . When there are no errors 204 (ϵ, ξ) = (0, 0) and no discount factor (w = 1), Eq. (32) corresponds to Extortion in 205 Press and Dyson [9] when κ = P and Generous in Stewart and Plotkin [23] when 206 κ = R. 207 We numerically calculated the minimum extortion factor χ c for subsets of ZD 208 strategies with 1 ≤ χ < ∞ to exist (Fig. 2) . Each curve corresponds to each w as 209 shown in the legend. The area surrounded by each curve and the vertical axis is the 210 region of χ which can be utilized by the ZD strategies when ϵ + ξ is fixed. As the error 211 ϵ + ξ becomes larger and the discount factor w becomes smaller, the minimum 212 extortion factor χ c becomes larger. 
Numerical examples of representative ZD and unconditional
214 strategies under errors in repeated games 215 We numerically demonstrate that ZD and unconditional strategies can impose a linear 216 relationship between the two players' payoffs while others cannot in the RPD game Figure 3 shows the relationship between the two players' expected payoffs per game 221 with payoff vector (T, R, P, S) = (1.5, 1, 0, −0.5). The gray quadrangle in each panel 222 represents the feasible set of payoffs. We fixed one particular strategy for player X 223 (vertical line) and randomly generated 1,000 strategies that satisfy 224 0 ≤ q 0 , q 1 , q 2 , q 3 , q 4 ≤ 1 for player Y (horizontal axis). Thus, each black dot represents 225 the payoff relationship between two players. In addition, the blue and red are the 226 particular cases for player Y . Red is the case that player Y is ALLD and blue is the Fig. 3F ).
241
However, as shown in Hao et. al [52] and Mamiya and Ichinose [53] , when there are 242 errors, there exists the region that the expected payoff of the Extortioner is lower than 243 the opponent's payoff near (P E , P E ) even though the increase of the Extortioner is still 244 larger than the opponent due to χ > 1 when the opponent tries to increase his payoff. Fig. 3C ). Also, when w = 0.9 and ϵ + ξ = 0 and 263 0.1, Equalizers p = (2/3, 0.277778, 0.722222, 1/3; 1/2), and 264 p = (0.833333, 0.350242, 0.649758, 1/6; 1/2) can fix the opponents' (player Y ) expected 265 payoffs at s Y = 0.5 irrespective of Y 's strategies, respectively (black and yellow-green 266 dots in Fig. 3G ). When w = 0.9 and ϵ + ξ = 0.2, there exists no Equalizer as shown in 267 Fig. 1 .
268
Lastly, we show the case of ALLD (Figs. 3D and H) . ALLD strategy is one of the 269 unconditional strategies where we set r = 0 in p = (r, r, r, r; r), 0 ≤ r ≤ 1. As shown in 270 Eq. We considered both a discount factor and observation errors in the RPD game and 276 analytically studied the strategies that enforce linear payoff relationships in the game. 277 January 13, 2020 10/18
First, we successfully derived the determinant form of the two players' expected 278 payoffs even though a discount factor and observation errors are incorporated. Then, 279 we searched for all possible strategies that enforce linear payoff relationships in the 280 RPD game. As a result, we found both ZD strategies and unconditional strategies are 281 the only strategy sets to enforce the relationship to the opponent. Moreover, we 282 numerically showed that minimum discount rates for Equalizer (χ → ∞) and 283 minimum extortion factors for other subsets of ZD strategies (1 ≤ χ ≤ ∞) above 284 which those ZD strategies exist.
285
Our results are limited to the two player RPD games. Other studies have focused 286 on n-player games [19, 26, 27, 56] . It is worth investigating games including observation 287 errors and a discount factor for n-player games . On the other hand, regarding 288 memory, our study only used memory-1 strategies. A recent study revealed the role of 289 longer memories for the evolution of cooperation, which is another direction to 290 investigate [51] . 
We show the sum of elements in the mean distribution
to one. We define
This is another form of Eq (13) . Because the sum of every row in the transition 305 matrix M is equal to one, the sum of every row of ∑ ∞ t=0 (wM ) t is equal to 1/(1 − w). 306 The sum of vector elements in v(0) is unchanged from 1 even if the vector is Eq. (14), respectively. We calculate the matrix multiplication v T M 0 .
Therefore, the following holds:
S3 Appendix. Strategies that enforce D(p, q, αS X + βS Y + γ1) = 0.
313
To search for all possible strategies that make D(p, q, αS X + βS Y + γ1) = 0, we 314 express Eq. (25) in component form: 
Here, we search for strategies which satisfy D(p, q, αS X + βS Y + γ1) = 0 irrespective 317 of Y 's strategy q, meaning that Eq. (37) must hold true irrespective of q. Therefore, 318 the coefficients of each element q in Eq. (37) must equal zero, that is, the following 
When Eq. (38) holds, the first terms of Eq. (37) are eliminated and we obtain 
When we solve the first four equations, we obtain (1) 
There exist real numbers s, t, u, v, α, β, and γ which satisfies Eq. (42) as follows:
Thus, when w = 0 (one-shot game), two player's payoffs always become linear 
Here, when we set t = 0, either equation
must hold. When we set v = 0, we obtain the trivial solution (s, t, u, v) = (0, 0, 0, 0).
345
Also, when we solve Eq. (47), we obtain the trivial solution (α, β, γ) = (0, 0, 0). Hence, 346 we do not have to consider the case of t = 0. Therefore, in the following, we only 347 consider t ̸ = 0. Replacing constants −αv/t, −βv/t, and −γv/t with α, β, and γ, we 
